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Can Our Community “Afford” this Bond Issue for Our School? 
 
Proposed Factors for Determining Affordability 
of School Building Projects 
 
 Each year various Indiana communities are asked to fund millions upon millions 
of dollars for public school building projects. In 2005, the most recent reported year, the 
Department of Local Government Finance, the state agency authorized to approve or 
disapprove school corporation proposals to construct new schools or to remodel existing 
schools, approved $1.3 billion in school construction projects.1 In that same year 
payments by Indiana taxpayers on construction debt consumed more than $777 million in 
property tax revenue.2 
 
 Recently the Fort Wayne Community Schools (FWCS) attempted to add another 
$500 million to the public debt.3 The taxpayers remonstrated and soundly defeated the 
proposed building project by more than a three to one margin.4 Although the margin of 
defeat was unusual, it was not unusual that a school district would lose a remonstrance. 
Less than 50% of the remonstrances in Indiana are won by taxpayers.5 Other than the 
large amount asked for by FWCS, there was nothing unusual about the debate concerning 
the building program or the results of the remonstrance. 
 
The remonstrators clamored throughout the petition process that the community 
couldn’t afford the half billion dollar building program. Just as vociferously, the 
supporters of the building program retorted that the community could afford it and that it 
was past time for the renovation of many of the buildings. As usual, both sides exhibited 
a tendency to use emotional rhetoric with scant supporting evidence of affordability. In 
other words, the debate was long on opinion and short on facts. 
 
Bond Ratings and Rating Criteria.  In 2005 the three bond rating agencies, 
Standard & Poor Corporation, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch IBCA rated $144.6 
billion in general obligation bonds and $264.5 billion in revenue debt.6 In assigning a 
rating, the agencies assess a school district’s ability to pay the principal and interest on 
debt by evaluating its economic base, financial condition and practices, certain debt 
factors, governance and planning, and whether the state has an oversight of local 
government’s issuance of debt and financial management practices.7 Hildreth & Miller 
(2002) stated that bond rating agencies typically will look at four main factors in 
assessing the credit quality of the school district which issues debt: (1) the economic 
base; (2) financial results; (3) debt levels; and (4) management capability.8 These four 
factors do not necessarily have equal weight.  
 
A bond rating is an opinion of the creditworthiness of the school district with 
regard to specific bond issue. A rating evaluates a government entity’s strength or 
weakness on factors that bear on the school district’s ability and willingness to make 
timely principal and interest payments on the debt. 9 The lower the bond ratings the 
higher the interest cost. 
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Standard and Poor bases an issuer’s rating for long-term debt on three basic 
factors: (1) the likelihood of the government entity’s meeting its financial commitment 
under the debt contract; (2) the nature and provisions of the debt contract, i.e. the security 
pledged and other protections afforded to investors; and (3) protections available to 
investors under laws that authorize and limit local debt and/or provide for its 
repayment.10 
 
A debt rating also takes into account credit support, if any, from bond insurance 
or other forms of financial guarantee for debt. Bond insurance guarantees to investors 
debt service payments and is now widely used in the debt market by school districts. 
Bond insurance raises a rating of the issuer to the triple-A rating of the insurance 
company.11 
 
According to Vogt (2004), ratings of general obligation bonds of local 
government entities are based on an assessment of the issuer’s general creditworthiness. 
He classifies the criteria for rating general obligation bonds into four categories: 
 
1. Local and regional economy conditions - Size, wealth, growth or change,  
  diversity, stability, infrastructure and facilities, and policies related to  
  sustainable growth or progress. 
2. Condition of local government finances - Growth or change in revenues  
  and spending, fund balance and reserves, budget practices, accounting and 
  financial reporting, tax and revenue administration, investment practices,  
  and other factors. 
3. The amount of debt burden - Net debt per capita and as a percentage of tax 
  or market valuation of real property, annual debt service on net debt in  
  relation to general fund and other governmental fund spending, net debt in 
  relation to personal income, pay-down pace for long-term net debt, and net 
  debt of overlapping and underlying jurisdictions. 
4. Governance and planning considerations - Coherence in local   
  governmental structure, ability of local elected officials to work together  
  and reach decisions, management, and multiyear planning.12 
 
School building corporation lease ratings are based on the essentiality of the 
school building financed with the lease and pledged to secure the debt. The more 
essential the building is, the less likely is the school district lessee to stop making 
payments on the debt and risk loss of the building.13  
 
The Question of Affordability.  FWCS was assured by its financial consultants 
that it would not incur any excessive interest premium costs with the proposed bond 
issue. The consultants advised that there would be no penalty exacted by the market 
because of the size of the massive bond issue. Proponents used this as a marker of 
whether the community could afford the bond issue. The fact of whether the bond market 
will extract a higher premium interest cost with the school district’s bond issue may 
indeed be one small indicator as to whether the community can afford it.  
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However, this particular criterion is not especially helpful in determining 
community affordability for two reasons. First, it only looks at the probability of 
repayment of the principal plus interest from the perspective of the purchasers of the 
bonds. It does not deal directly with the issue of whether the community can afford it. 
Secondly, Indiana has a statute that guarantees the payment of the bond issue if the 
school district defaults.14 This statute requires the state treasurer to make the principal 
and interest payments that were not paid but due on the bonds, and to reduce the school 
district’s revenues that it receives from the state, in order to pay for the bond payments in 
default. Thus, the bondholders are guaranteed by statute that they will be paid, reducing 
their risk to near zero. Therefore, there is no need for the bond market to extract a 
premium from a school district that might not be able to afford a particular bond issue. It 
is possible to have a situation that the bondholders get paid, but the school district has 
insufficient funds to make payroll for its teachers. Certainly, in that event it would appear 
the community could not afford the bond issue. Indiana school boards and taxpayers have 
been lulled into a false sense of security by this statute, thinking that if the bond market 
does not add a premium to the interest cost that the community can afford it. 
 
The supporters in the FWCS case were buttressed with the argument that the 
Yellow Ribbon Panel15 looked at the needs of FWCS and the ability of the FWCS to fund 
the project and concluded that the needs existed for a half-billion dollar building project 
and proclaimed that the community could afford assumption of a half-billion dollar debt 
load.  
 
There was nothing unusual about a school board appointing a group of interested 
lay citizens to make a recommendation to the school board on the need for a building 
program and whether the community can afford it. But that is precisely the problem that 
exists throughout Indiana – that this is a common practice. Such panels are almost always 
appointed by the schools’ administration and the school board with the unstated criteria 
that most of the panel is likely to support a building project. Such panels are normally 
anything but unbiased and neutral. Many community members are smart enough to 
realize that such bodies are simply the alter ego of the superintendent and school board 
and do not provide unbiased advice.   
 
However, the purpose of this paper is not to bash citizen advisory committees. 
This paper is intended to deal with the issue of affordability of school district bond issues.  
Communities need more than just seat-of-the-pant guesses as to whether a particular 
community can afford a proposed bond issue. But seldom, if ever, does the conversation 
and debate surrounding a proposed bond issue elevate beyond opinions, misstatements of 
fact, and misrepresentations. Simply put, debates surrounding proposed Indiana school 
corporation bond issues are long on rhetoric and short on the facts.  
 
The FWCS case study is just one recent example of the lack of facts concerning 
the issue of affordability. The Yellow Ribbon panel failed to report any factors or 
guidelines that they used to determine whether the Fort Wayne community could afford a 
half-billion dollar bond issue. It was simply the personal judgment of some members of 
the panel that the community could afford the proposed bond issue – a judgment 
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unsupported by any publicly revealed facts or data. But this is not unusual. This is 
standard operating procedure by so-called citizen advisory groups. But it does not have to 
be this way. There are quantitative data and measurements available to use in determining 
whether a community can afford a particular bond issue. 
 
Affordability from the School District’s Perspective. There is a growing 
concern among state policy makers that unrestrained debt may exceed politically 
acceptable or financially sustainable levels of debt.16 Affordability is one important and 
widely accepted element of state and local debt policy. However, in Indiana there is no 
general use of well-established measure of affordability and no clear standard for making 
normative judgments about what amount of debt is affordable for a specific school 
district.17 Brecher, Richwerger, and Van Wagner (2003) define “affordability” as keeping 
the cost of debt in line with a jurisdiction’s economic and fiscal base. They argue that to 
qualify as an affordable bond issue, the repayment of debt (1) should not cause a 
government unit’s tax rate to increase to uncompetitive levels in order to cover the debt 
service, and (2) should not require cutbacks in other public services that similarly cause 
the government unit to become uncompetitive with other areas.18 Thus, they would 
compare other governmental units to determine if the debt is “too much.” They also argue 
that affordability should be assessed as a relationship between the amount of debt and the 
resources available for repayment. They present six analytic steps to assess affordability: 
 
1. Identify the amount of relevant long-term debt. 
2. Adjust the amount of long-term debt to include unfunded pension   
  liabilities. 
3. Identify the resources available to repay the debt. 
4. Adjust the resources available to account for the division of   
  responsibilities between the state and local government units. 
5. Examine the distribution of the ratio of adjusted debt to adjusted resources 
  in order to identify a point that is sufficiently “out of line” with most  
  governmental units’ practices that it constitutes the beginning of a danger  
  zone. 
6. Adjust the danger zone threshold to provide a safety margin for an   
  economic downturn.19 
 
There are a few informal guidelines that have been used by some Indiana school 
boards when determining whether the school district’s taxpayers can afford a bond issue. 
Some financial consultants have advised school boards that the school corporation’s debt 
as a percentage of assessed valuation of taxable real property should be generally be 
under 15% in growing communities. For static communities who are not growing, the 
ratio should generally be in the 10%-12% range. For communities who are in decline, the 
percentage varies based upon the individual demographic and economic factors in the 
community, but it is usually suggested that the debt ratio to assessed valuation be kept 
under 10%.20     
 
One can also look at the guidelines used by the Indiana Department of Local 
Government (the “Department”). Indiana school corporations must obtain Department 
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approval before they incur bond indebtedness or enter into a lease agreement for 
financing a school building project.21 Before the Department makes a determination on a 
building project’s financing, the Department may, and almost always does so, seek the 
recommendation of the School Property Tax Control Board (the “Control Board”).22 The 
Control Board, when requested by the Department, will hold a hearing on the requested 
financing and make a recommendation to the Department. The Department may approve, 
disapprove, or modify the recommendation regarding a proposed bond issue or lease 
rental agreement.23 
 
The Indiana General Assembly described in statute what factors the Department 
and Control Board are to use in their determination of whether to approve or disapprove a 
school building construction project. These factors are: 
 
1. The current and proposed square footage of school building space 
per student. 
2. Enrollment patterns within the school corporation. 
3. The age and condition of the current school facilities. 
4. The cost per square foot of the school building construction 
project. 
5. The effect that completion of the school building construction 
project would have on the school corporation’s tax rate. 
6. Any other pertinent matter.24 
 
Note the absence of any express factor dealing specifically with the issue of 
community affordability. The Department and Control Board do state in their published 
guidelines that they “will also consider any other pending or potential debt service issues 
by other political subdivisions within the school district and the impact of those debt 
issues on the total tax rate” and that “(I)f the tax rate for a district is already overly 
burdensome, a project may be rejected with instructions to find a more cost-efficient 
alternative to addressing the school’s needs.” 25 The Department also states in its 
guidelines that “(A) school’s annual financial performance report will also be considered 
in reviewing the district’s overall financial condition and ability to fund long term 
operating costs.”26 Finally, the Department informs citizens in its guidelines that it will 
consider, among other things, “the support or resistance of the community.”27 The 
Department concludes its guidelines by stating: “(T)his guidance is not an exhaustive list 
of factors that will be examined and considered by the Department and Control Board.”28 
 
Although the above guidance from the Department may be helpful in dealing with 
the issue of community affordability, it does not go far enough in describing the factors it 
will consider in making a determination that the project and its bond issue will be “overly 
burdensome.” School Facility Guidelines29 adopted by the Indiana State Board of 
Education use such vague phrases as “economically efficient system of school facilities;” 
“maximize the cost benefit;” “study…impact of the proposed building project;” “local 
community interest;” “effect on the community as a whole;” economic interest of the 
community;” and “ability to fund the project.” None of these vague guidelines are 
especially helpful in determining the affordability of a specific bond issue.  
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In fact, there are no criteria specified precisely to answer this question. Thus, 
there is a need for further guidelines. The good news is that there are guidelines available. 
A search of other municipalities’ and states’ guidelines reveals some possibilities that 
could be added to the Department’s and the State Board of Education’s guidelines. 
 
The creation of debt by a school district places an obligation on its taxpayers to 
repay the principal and interest on the bonds from property taxes. One measure of a 
community’s wealth is its assessed valuation of its property. Thus, conventional debt 
studies usually include an indicator measuring debt as a proportion of the value of the 
property tax base. Another usual indicator is debt per capita. However, these indicators 
may not reveal the vulnerability of a community that is not economically diverse. 
 
Hildreth and Miller (2002) argue that economic factors should be more closely 
connected to debt factors in assessing the vulnerability to a downgrade in bond rating 
They argue for a broader analytical approach that measures and incorporates economic 
analysis as well as comparison with other localities as to whether a community can afford 
a certain debt level. They suggest an analysis of the economic base include its diversity. 
To not analyze the economic base of a community could lead to fiscal distress for the 
local government entity issuing the bonds, as well as the community itself. 
 
There are several types of economic diversity that can be measured in a 
community.30 Fundamental diversity of a large metropolitan area is one type. A 
community with many employers and a good mix of different types of industry and 
businesses will be looked upon favorably. The second type of diversity is where the local 
economy appears to be diverse, but is not in reality, as it is dependent, not on a single 
employer, but on a single core industry. An example is where the largest employers are 
all car manufacturers and their many suppliers. Property classifications are a third type of 
diversity. Property can be residential, commercial, industrial, offices, rental/residential, 
farmland, lots, or vacant buildings.  
 
The financial condition of individual taxpayers and businesses affect the school 
corporation’s borrowing capacity. Without a viable local economy, there is no real 
security for the debt, other than the Indiana statute, because there is an insufficient tax 
base to repay the debt. (Hildreth & Miller, 2002).  
 
Moody’s analysts have used the diversification of the economic base in 
determining their bond ratings.31 One important factor they use is the number of 
businesses and industrial concerns in the community. The larger the number the more 
diverse the community is. A common approach in measuring the economic base of a 
community is to measure the value of real estate owned by the top ten taxpayers as a 
percentage of the community’s total assessed valuation. Thus, a community with say 90% 
of its assessed valuation in the hands of the top 10 property owners is more vulnerable to 
a downturn than one with only 10% of the assessed value held by the top ten property 
owners. Another way to measure diversification of the economic base is to compare all 
the firms in a particular industry to all the other industries in the community. If say 90% 
of the assessed value is in one industry, even though it may be spread around in many 
different companies, that community is more vulnerable than a community with only 
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10% of the assessed value in the largest and dominate industry. In summary, the revenue 
variables are less important than the base from which the revenues are taken (Hildreth & 
Miller, 2002). 
 
Conventional debt affordability studies usually focus on debt levels and not 
economic concentration of business and industry. Hildreth and Miller (2002) argue that 
both debt levels and economic concentration are important factors in determining debt 
affordability of local communities.  
 
Outstanding debt per capita and debt as a percentage of the tax value of property 
are two factors that can be considered in evaluating affordability. Another way of 
measuring affordability of debt levels is to compare the debt levels and concentration of 
business and industry with other communities of similar demographics, size, and wealth. 
National norms can also be used as a measure. Medians are particularly helpful to assess 
debt affordability. Moody’s Medians can be used to provide measure four key local 
government debt levels: (1) net debt per capita for the single government entity; (2) 
combined net debt per capita for all the government entities in the taxing jurisdiction; (3) 
net debt to property tax value for the single jurisdiction; (4) and combined net debt to 
property tax value for all the government entities in the taxing jurisdiction. Groves and 
Valente (1994) propose that if net debt as a percentage of taxable value of property is 
greater than or equal to 20 percent over the past year or 50 percent over the amount four 
years earlier, the community cannot afford the bond issue.32 
 
In North Carolina, the Local Government Commission uses these criteria in 
deciding whether a local government unit can sell a general obligation bond: (1) the 
adequacy of the bond amount; (2) the bond’s effect on the property tax rate; and (3) 
whether the bond can be marketed at a reasonable interest rate.33 
 
Predicting Fiscal Distress. An additional measure of community affordability of 
proposed debt is to determine the likelihood that the school might become a financially 
distressed school corporation.34 It is not just the school district that should be the focus of 
concern as to the possibility that the proposed bond issue would jeopardize the financial 
health of the school district, but the entire community should also be the focus as well.  
The entire economic health of the community is at risk if only one governmental entity 
undertakes action that creates fiscal distress for the entire community.  
 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) conducted 
one of the early studies that examined the fiscal health of local government entities. The 
ACIR identified six early warning signs of possible distress for local government entities 
which are:  
 
1.  an operating fund revenue to expenditure imbalance in which current  
  expenses significantly exceed current revenues in at least one fiscal  
  period; 
2.  a consistent pattern of current expenses exceeding current revenues by  
  small amounts for several years; 
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3. an excess of current operating liabilities over current assets; 
4. short-term operating loans outstanding at the conclusion of a fiscal year; 
5. a high and rising rate of property tax delinquency; and 
6. a sudden and substantial decrease in assessed values for unexpected  
  reasons. 35 
 
Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine (2005) offer a 10-point scale that predicts local 
government financial problems before they become serious. The scale uses nine 
indicators: 
 
1. population change over two-year periods, with a benchmark standard of  
  showing no population loss; 
2. real taxable value growth (inflation-adjusted) over two-year periods, with  
  a benchmark standard of showing any positive growth; 
3. large real taxable decrease of less than -0.04 in real growth over a two- 
  year period (more than one standard deviation below the average two-year 
  growth rate for cities and villages);  
4. general fund expenditures as a percentage of current year’s taxable value, 
  with a benchmark standard set at one-half standard deviation from the  
  average of the type of governmental units compared; 
5. general fund operating deficit in the current year with the benchmark  
  standard set at one percent or less deficit; 
6. general fund operating deficit over the past two years, with the benchmark 
  standard set at no operating deficit; 
7. general fund balance as a proportion of general fund revenues, with the  
  benchmark standard set at one-half deviation below the average for the  
  type of governmental units compared; 
8. negative balance in the current or previous year in either the general,  
  special, capital, or debt service funds, with the benchmark standard set at  
  no negative balance in any of the four funds in either year; 
9. general long-term debt as a percentage of taxable value with a benchmark 
  standard of one deviation from the average debt-to-taxable value ratio of  
  the type of government units compared.  
 
In order to predict the impact of a school bond issue, and whether the issue will 
lead to financial distress, a study of the school district’s financial condition is necessary. 
The most widely held concept of good financial condition is the ability of an organization 
to timely meet its financial obligations. If the organization can pay its obligations without 
incurring significant financial hardship it may be presumed that the organization is in 
sound financial condition.36 
 
Wang, Dennis, and Yuan Sen (2007)37 developed and tested a measure of 
financial conditions of state governments. Their study used four dimensions of solvency 
associated with the concept of financial condition:  
 
1. Cash solvency; 
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2. budgetary solvency; 
3. long-run solvency; and 
4. service-level solvency. 
To measure cash solvency, they used three indicators: (1) the cash ratio (cash + 
cash equivalents + investments / current liabilities; (2) the quick ratio (cash + cash 
equivalents + investments + receivables / current liabilities; and (3) the current ratio 
(current assets / current liabilities). 
 
To measure budget solvency, they used these two indicators: (1) the operating 
ratio (total revenues / total expenses); and (2) surplus or deficit per capita (total surpluses 
or deficits / population). 
 
To measure long-term solvency, they used these three indicators: (1) net asset 
ratio (restricted and unrestricted net assets / total assets); (2) long-term liability ratio 
(long-term non-current liabilities / total assets); and (3) long-term liability per capita 
(long-term non-current liabilities / population). 
 
To measure service solvency, they used two indicators: (1) revenue per capita 
(total revenues / population); and (2) expenses per capita (total expenses / population). 
 
Measuring and Determining Debt Capacity. Denison, Hackbart & Moody 
(2006) define debt capacity as a state’s ability to sustain debt in the long run (however 
they fail to define “the long run”). They suggest that in this context, it is the amount of 
debt that a state can afford.38 They recant a variety of ways debt capacity can be 
measured for states as set out by various scholars. These measurements include: whether 
the debt places unacceptable or undue burdens on state services and the state’s budget; 
debt per capita; total debt outstanding; debt relative to current revenues; debt ratios, 
limits, and burdens of similar governments; and debt service as a percent of current 
revenues.39 
 
The Government Finance Officers Association recommends that state and local 
government issuers of bonds analyze their debt capacities before they issue bonds.40 
Galgano (2001) informs that the same factors that bond rating agencies use whey they 
evaluate a government entity’s ability to repay its debt should be used as factors that local 
governments use to evaluate their own debt capacity. These factors measure 
demographic, wealth, and management factors, and include these indices: 
 
1. Ratio of total debt to fair market value of taxable property (debt burden)  
  which helps assess government entity’s wealth;  
2. Ratio of total GO debt divided by the government entity’s population base  
  (debt per capita), and if too high, may suggest that the entity may not be  
  willing or able to pay debt service in future; 
3. Debt per capita divided by average personal income (debt to income),  
  which reflects the individual taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes to service the  
  debt; 
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4. Debt service divided by general fund expenditures (debt service as a  
  percentage of general fund expenditures), which reveals the amount of  
  expenditures used to pay debt service and shows budget flexibility; 
5. Top five taxpayers should not account for more than 25 percent of the tax  
  base, and the largest taxpayer should not account for more than 10  
  percent (tax base diversity), which diversity will allow the debt to be paid  
  even if one or more of the largest employers fails to pay its taxes; 
6. Market value divided by population (market value per capita), which can  
  indicate the wealth of the community; 
7. Growth patterns of tax base (historic rate of tax base growth), which can  
  help indicate what the debt burden might be in the future; 
8. History of tax collections (tax collections), which can help measure the  
  citizens’ ability to pay the debt service; and 
9. General fund ending balance divided by expenditures (financial   
  obligations), which indicates the government entity’s ability and   
  willingness to live within its means, and can also indicate the sufficiency  
  of its reserves.41 
 
The Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
has published local debt capacity guidelines.42 Determining how much debt a school 
district can afford to issue is an important step in the district’s capital projects planning 
and overall fiscal management. A school district’s debt capacity can be measured by 
assessing the school district’s financial resources and revenues that will be available to 
pay the debt service on all its bond issues. This can be started by looking, according to 
Vogt (2004), at the government unit’s current financial position, its prospects, and key 
debt ratios. Vogt argues that there are numerous ratios available for measuring local debt 
burden, but the most frequently used are: (1) net debt per capita; (2) net debt as a 
percentage of taxable or market valuation; and (3) annual debt service on net debt as a 
percentage of general fund revenues or spending, including any other operating funds that 
pay for government services, if any. Vogt defines net debt as debt that is paid from 
general revenues or taxes. This includes debt for holding corporation leases. It also can be 
described as the bonds, capital lease obligations, and other debt that is not self-supporting 
or self-liquidating and which must be paid from general revenues and taxes. 
 
Vogt (2004) also states that there are other ratios for assessing net debt. He asserts 
that median family income, personal income, or per capita income for a community can 
measure a community’s wealth and therefore ultimately the ability of citizens to pay debt 
service on net debt and support other local government spending. However, income data 
are not available for many medium and small jurisdictions. 
 
The National Advisory Council on State and Local Budgeting recommends that a 
governmental entity should adopt a policy that sets forth the maximum amount of debt 
that should be outstanding at any one time.43 This suggests that school districts would be 
well served by adopting a policy setting out the maximum amount of debt service that the 
school board would be willing to accept at any given time. 
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Examples of Debt Affordability Policies by Local Government. Mecklenburg 
County, North Carolina, adopted a debt policy concerning debt affordability, among other 
policy matters.44 The adopted policy sets forth that the County will use an objective, 
analytical approach to determine the amount of debt to be considered for authorization 
and issuance. The county compares what it calls generally accepted standards of 
affordability to the current County values. These standards include: 
 
1. Debt per capita – which measures the burden of debt placed on the 
size of the population supporting the debt and, according to the 
County, is widely used by analysts as a measure of an issuers’ 
ability to repay debt. The county set a range of $3,500 to $3,600 
for the ceiling for debt per capita. 
2. Debt as percentage of assessed valuation – this ratio measures debt 
level against the property tax base which generates the tax 
revenues that are the main source of debt repayment. The County 
targeted the ratio at 3.3% with a ceiling of 4.0%. 
3. Debt service as percentage of operational budget – this ratio 
reflects the County’s budgetary flexibility to change spending and 
respond to economic downturns. The County targeted a ratio at 
14% with a ceiling of 16%. 
4. Ten-year payout ratio – a faster payout is considered to be a 
positive credit attribute according to the County. The County 
policy set a floor for its ten-year payment of 64.0%. 
5. Unreserved/undesignated general fund balance – a cash balance in 
the general fund (operating fund) is always advisable for any 
organization to pay for emergency or unplanned expenditures. The 
County set a target range of unreserved general fund balance to 
general fund expenses at 12% to 14% and the target for 
undesignated fund balance at 8% of budgeted expenses. 
 
Montgomery County, Maryland established a fiscal policy and set out its criteria 
for determining debt capacity for the County.45  Maryland County declared its goal as to 
maintain its AAA rating and adopted the following guidelines to be used in deciding how 
much additional County general obligation debt may be issued in a six year period: 
 
1. Total debt, both existing and proposed, should be kept at about 
1.5% of full market value of taxable real property in the County. 
2. Required annual debt service expenditures should be kept at about 
10% of the County’s total general fund operating budget. 
3. Total debt outstanding and annual amounts issued, when adjusted 
for inflation, should not cause real debt per capita to rise 
significantly. 
4. The rate of repayment of bond principal should be kept at existing 
high levels and in the 60-75% range during any ten-year period. 
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5. Total debt outstanding and annual amounts proposed should not 
cause the ratio of per capita debt to per capita income to rise 
significantly above its current level of about 3.5%.46 
 
           Allegany County, Maryland, adopted a policy regarding affordability of debt.47 
The County stated that debt affordability can be determined by examining and deciding 
the maximum amount of debt that can be borrowed by the County. Two overall 
constraints were adopted by the County, to wit: (1) that the amount of debt per person 
will not exceed $585, and (2) that the debt service payments should be kept at the current 
level of $5 million per year as adjusted for inflation for the general fund. The County also 
adopted the use of three ratios to use in the determination of affordability of debt: 
 
1. General fund debt service divided by general fund revenue shall not  
  exceed 11.70%. 
2. General fund debt service divided by general fund expenditures shall not 
exceed 13.50%. 
3. Debt divided by the full property value shall not exceed 3.15%. 
 
The Los Angeles Unified School District has also adopted a debt policy.48 An 
overall limit on the total outstanding debt (the principal portion only) was set at 2.5% of 
the assessed valuation of the taxable property of the District (with tax and revenue 
anticipation notes and lease payment obligations in support of certificates of participation 
generally excluded).  The policy sets forth four debt burden ratios that the District will 
consider in developing its debt issuance plans: 
 
1. Ratio of outstanding debt to assessed value – the ratio is to be calculated 
for both direct debt (G.O.s) and combined direct debt (G.O.s and COPs) or 
overall debt burden, where G.O.s are general obligation bonds and COPs 
are certificates of participations. 
2. Ratio of outstanding debt per capita – This computes outstanding debt 
divided by the population residing in the District. Ratios are required for 
both direct debt per capita and overall debt per capita. 
3. Ratio of annual lease debt service to general funds expenditures – For this 
computation, annual lease debt service expenditures are divided by general 
funds (i.e. general and debt service funds) expenditures (excluding 
interfund transfers). 
4. Proportion of fixed-rate and variable-rate COPs issues – The District 
must keep its variable rate exposure, to the extent not hedged or swapped 
to fixed rate, at or below 20% of the total principal of outstanding COPs or 
$100 million, whichever is less.49 
 
The District policy also states that the determination of how much indebtedness 
the District should incur will be based on the impact of planned debt issuances on the  
long-term affordability of all outstanding debt. The affordability of the incurrence of debt 
is to be determined by calculating various debt ratios which would result after issuance of 
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the debt and analyzing the trends over time. The District’s debt factors and its debt 
burden ratios are set forth in tables 1 and 2 below: 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Debt Factors 
 
Table 2 
Debt Burden Ratios 
 
Debt Burden Ratio Benchmark 
Direct Debt to Assessed Value (1) Moody’s Median for Aa Rated School Districts 
with Student Population Above 200,000 
(2) Standard & Poor’s Mean for AA Rated School 
Districts with Student Population Above 150,000 
Overall Debt to Assessed Value 
 
 
(1) Moody’s Median for Aa Rated School Districts 
with Student Population Above 200,000 
(2) Standard & Poor’s Mean for AA Rated School 
Districts with Student Population Above 150,000 
Direct Debt Per Capita (1) Standard & poor’s Median for AA Rated School 
Districts with Student Population Above 150,000  
(2) Standard & poor’s Mean for AA Rated School 
Districts with Student Population Above 150,000 
Overall Debt Per Capita (1) Standard & Poor’s Median for AA Rated School 
Districts with Student Population Above 150,000 
(2) Standard & Poor’s Mean for AA Rated School 
Districts with Student Population Above 150,000 
 
 
 “Direct Debt” includes all debt that is repaid from the general fund or from any 
tax revenues deposited into special funds not supporting revenue bonds. “Overall Debt” 
includes any debt that is paid from general tax revenues and special assessments by 
residents in the District. This includes debt issued by other agencies whose taxing 
boundaries overlap the District, but excludes revenue bonds. 
 
 A final example of a debt affordability policy is Texas. That state conducted a 
debt affordability study.50 This was the first debt affordability study for the state of Texas 
which had traditionally used a decentralized approach to debt authorization and issuance. 
The study provided policymakers with a broad perspective on Texas’s debt position and 
will serve as a tool for evaluating the fiscal impact of bond financing options. The Texas 
study proclaimed a number of benefits and goals of using a debt affordability study: 
 
1. Provides a big-picture view of the state’s debt position; 
Debt Factor Target Ceiling 
COP Debt Service Limit (gross) 2.0% of General Funds Expenses 2.5% of General Funds Expenses 
COP Gross Debt Service Cap $105 Million $105 Million 
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2. Matches available debt funding with prioritized capital needs, by 
providing a tool to integrate debt management in the capital planning 
process; 
3. Establishes a systemic approach to debt management; 
4. Helps centralize debt management and authorization decisions; 
5. Helps assess the effect of individual or a group of new debt authorizations 
on the state’s debt burden; 
6. Evaluates the effect of fluctuating revenues on the state’s ability to meet 
existing debt service obligations and to issue new debt; 
7. Ensures sufficient cash balances and reserves; 
8. Protects and enhances the state’s bond rating and outlook; 
9. Helps achieve the lowest cost financing for taxpayers; and 
10. Assists in maximizing resources for debt financing.51  
 
 The Texas study defined debt affordability as an integrated approach that helps 
analyze and manage state debt by factoring in historical debt use, financial and economic 
resources of the state, and long-term goals for capital needs. The debt affordability study 
presents the state’s current debt burden with an overview of the state’s historical and 
current debt. The authors of the study affirmed that one key component of debt 
affordability is determining the state’s additional debt capacity, which they said was to be 
measured in terms of annual debt service capacity.52 To determine debt affordability, 
Texas used five key ratios: 
 
1. Not self-supporting debt service as a percentage of unrestricted revenues -
This ratio helps determine additional debt service capacity for not self-
supporting debt. The study used a guideline of a two percent target and a 
three percent cap. The Texas constitution prevents debt issuance to no 
more than five percent of unrestricted general revenue funds. 
2. Not self-supporting debt to personal income – The capability of the state’s 
populace to absorb the financial debt is determined by the ratio. Standard 
& Poor’s considers a ratio of 0 percent to 3 percent to be a low debt 
burden. Texas calculates that at current and projected debt and personal 
income levels, over a five-year period this ratio ranges from a high of 0.34 
percent in fiscal year 2007 to a low of 0.19 percent in fiscal year 2011. 
When compared to a peer group of the ten most populous states Texas has 
the lowest debt to personal income ratio. 
3. Not self-supporting debt per capita – This ratio also serves an important 
role in rating a state’s bond issues by the bond rating agencies. Under 
$1,000 of state debt per capita is considered low by Standard & Poor’s. 
Over a five year period, Texas calculates a range for this ratio of $119.24 
in fiscal year 2007 to $80.33 in fiscal year 2011. Texas has the lowest debt 
per capita in the ten-state peer group. However, the report states that 
Texas’s low state debt burden is due to having a higher local government 
debt burden. Thus, state elected officials can manipulate the state into 
appearing to be a low debt burden state by simply passing on the debt 
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burden to local governments and requiring them to issue bonds for needs 
that some states do on a statewide basis. 
4. Rate of debt to retirement – This ratio highlights the state’s progress on 
retiring debt in a timely fashion. The rapidity at which long-term debt 
obligations are repaid measures the extent to which repayments create 
capacity for future debt issuance. For a 20-year bond, the bond rating 
agencies expect that 25 percent of the bond will be retired at five years and 
that 50 percent of the bond principal will be paid off by 10 years. This is 
considered the average ratio by the bond rating agencies. Texas’s current 
rate of retirement for not self-supporting debt is a 78.29 percent principal 
payout in a ten year period, which is a high rate of retirement.  
5. Not self-supporting debt service as a percentage of budgeted general 
revenue – This ratio shows how much of budgeted (or expended for 
complete fiscal years) general revenues are dedicated to long-term debt 
financing. This is a reflection of the state’s financial flexibility. This ratio 
is similar to the first ratio, but is more restricted because the pool of 
available general revenue in this ratio is limited to budgeted general 
revenue, which is generally less than all unrestricted general revenue that 
is available for debt service. The higher the percentage of the budget 
reserved for debt service, the less financial flexibility the state has for 
responding to economic slowdowns, unexpected expenses, or changes in 
budget priorities for operation or fixed capital outlay expenditures. Since 
fiscal year 1996, Texas has had a not self-supporting debt service 
commitment of less than 1.5 percent of expended general revenues.53 
 
Analysis and Recommendation for Adoption of Affordability Guidlines. So 
what does all of the above mean? As evidenced above, Indiana has few meaningful 
guidelines on the issue of the affordability of a school district’s debt. The state of Indiana 
has essentially passed off the burden to determine local affordability of school bond 
issues to the local school boards and their taxpayers. What isn’t found is a meaningful use 
by any level of government, state or local, of quantitative measures to help determine 
affordability of school district bond issues. State guidelines in Indiana such as “the 
effect…the project would have on the school corporation’s tax rate”; and “if the tax rate 
for a district is already overly burdensome”; and “the support or resistance of the 
community” are wholly inadequate measures to determine whether a community can 
afford a particular bond issue. It is important for the analysis of affordability to go far 
beyond just glancing at tax rates and letters in support or against the issuance of proposed 
debt. A more thorough and precise quantitative analysis will help taxpayers make better 
informed judgments about the affordability of school bond issues. 
 
Affordability in Indiana has largely been equated to whether it is financially 
feasible for the school district to issues its bonds. The current guidelines are not adequate 
to measure whether the citizens of a community can afford a bond issue. The current 
guidelines tend to look at the affordability from only the school district perspective. But 
what about individual homeowners of the community? What about the retiree who lives 
on social security alone and is trying to hold onto his or her house in old age? What about 
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the factory worker who just became unemployed when his factory closed its doors and 
who is rapidly falling behind on his or her mortgage payments? What about the white 
collar worker who has lost his or her job to a company located in a foreign country and is 
struggling not only to pay the house payments but to feed the children? What about the 
professional worker who is laid off from a high salary job and who can only find work in 
a retail store at barely above minimum wage? What about the renters who can barely 
afford the monthly rent payment but will be facing higher rent payments as landlords 
recoup their higher property taxes as a result of the issuance of more and more debt by a 
school district? Where are their measures, guidelines, and ratios of affordability? Who is 
looking out for the poor, the disabled, the aged, and the families who are economically 
deprived? None of the guidelines set forth above appear to be concerned with the 
affordability of school district debt on these disadvantaged groups in society. The state of 
Indiana has no public measures of the personal and economic impact of school district 
debt on these groups of people. 
 
This glaring flaw in Indiana’s system for financing long-term debt for school 
districts may have contributed to the proliferation of school bond issues. According to the 
Indiana Governor’s office, last year one-quarter of all property tax payments went to 
debt. Seventy-five percent were for school district obligations. Property taxes dedicated 
to debt are increasing eight percent annually.54  
 
What this writer suggests is a tripartite measurement of affordability of school 
district debt. This measurement can also be used in determining affordability of other 
debt issued by other local government units.  
 
The first group of measurements of affordability needs to concern the school 
district itself. The school district affordability index should be used to measure internal 
affordability of the school district when it proposes to issue its bonds. If the school 
district defaults on its long-term debt, the state will step in and deduct general fund 
revenue from the school district. This can result in severe cutbacks in educational 
services and cause substantial turmoil and disruption in the community. The economic 
impact would ripple through the community as school workers are laid off and have little 
or no money to spend in the community. 
 
A second group of measurements can be termed the community affordability 
index. This index measures whether the community as a whole can afford the bond issue. 
Perhaps the school district will not become financially distressed by issuing the bonds, 
but if the overall tax rate in the community, including overlapping tax rates of all taxing 
units in the community, becomes excessive - disastrous community and business 
economic effects can result. Businesses and families may flee the community for 
communities with less burdensome tax rates. 
 
The final group of measurements can be termed individual and family 
affordability index. This index may be used to measure the human impact on individuals 
and families in the community who may not be as economically advantaged as others, 
and who are often overlooked by school boards who propose bond issues. This might be 
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called the individual and family “misery index.” Burdensome property tax payments will 
jeopardize the American dream of home ownership for homeowners who are in the lower 
economic range and are marginally hanging on to their homes on a month to month and 
paycheck to paycheck basis. The needs of this group are seldom the discussion of school 
boards. School boards, understandably so, focus on the needs of the school district. The 
loss of homes by this group because of the burdensome tax rates is the silent cost of 
school district bond issues. 
 
Various measurements, guidelines, and ratios that may be used in determining 
affordability of proposed school district debt are presented below. This recommendation 
can be used to determine affordability of school district bond issues in relation to each of 
the three above referenced groups. What this paper will not attempt to do is to set specific 
standards for each recommended measurement, guideline, and ratio. The setting of 
standards, limits, and caps is a political decision and is best left for elected officials after 
informed discussion by the electorate. However, by adopting quantitative criteria for use 
by government officials in calculating debt affordability, the citizens can better judge 
whether proposed debt is in reality affordable for the school district, the community, and 
its less fortunate residents. The citizens will also be better prepared with data to hold 
government officials accountable to carry out their responsibility to issue government 
debt only when affordable. The recommendations are set forth below in tables 3, 4, and 5. 
 
 
Table 4 
School District Affordability Index 
 
Index Item Description 
Cash Ratio Cash + cash equivalents + investments / current liabilities 
Quick Ratio Cash + cash equivalents + investments + receivables / current 
liabilities 
Current Ratio Current assets / current liabilities 
Operating Ratio Total revenue / total expenses 
Surplus or Deficit Per Capita Ratio Total surpluses or deficits / population 
Net Asset Ratio Restricted and unrestricted net assets / total assets 
Long-term Liability Ratio Long-term non-current liabilities / total assets 
Long-term Liability Per Capita Ratio Long-term non current liabilities / population 
Revenue Per Capita Ratio Total revenues / population 
Expenses Per Capita Ratio Total expenses / population 
Total Debt Outstanding Sum of all debt for school district 
Debt Service to Expense Ratio Debt service payments / general fund expenditures 
Debt Service to Revenue Ratio Debt service payments / general fund revenue 
Expense to Assessed Value Ratio General fund expenses / assessed value of all real estate 
GF Balance to GF Revenue Ratio General Fund balance / General Fund total revenue 
Ten-year Payout Ratio Rate of repayment of bond principal over ten year period 
Current Operating Liabilities Whether there is an excess of current operating liabilities over 
current assets 
Substantial General Fund Deficit Whether current expenses exceed current revenues by substantial 
amount in at least one fiscal period during past three years 
Pattern of General Fund Deficit Whether there has been a consistent pattern of current expenses 
exceeding current revenues by small amounts for several years 
Unfunded Liability Whether there are any unfunded liabilities 
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Services Cutback Whether repayment of debt causes cutback in school district 
services resulting in school district becoming uncompetitive 
Bond Interest Rate Whether the bond issue can be marketed at a reasonable interest 
rate 
Overall Financial Condition Whether the school district’s annual financial report shows 
overall financial condition and ability to fund long-term operating 
costs and the debt 
Controlled School Corporation Whether the school district is a controlled school district 
 
 
Table 4 
Community Affordability Index 
 
Index Item Description 
Net Long-term School District Debt 
Per Capita Ratio 
Total long-term school district debt / population in school district 
Net Long-term Community Debt Per 
Capita Ratio 
Total long-term debt of school district and overlapping 
jurisdictions / population in school district 
Net Long-term Debt to Personal 
Income Ratio 
Net long-term debt / median household net income before taxes 
Per Capita School District Net Long-
term Debt to Per Capita Income Ratio 
Per Capita net long-term school district debt / per capita income 
of school district residents 
Per Capita Community Long-term 
Debt to Per Capita Income Ratio 
Total net long-term debt of school district and overlapping  
jurisdictions / per capita income of school district residents 
School District Tax Rate Whether school district tax rate is burdensome 
Net Long-term School District Debt to 
AV Ratio 
Net long-term school district debt / total assessed valuation of all 
real estate in school district 
Net Long-term Community Debt to 
AV Ratio 
Net long-term debt of school district and overlapping 
jurisdictions / total assessed valuation of all real estate in school 
district 
Decrease in AV Whether the assessed valuation of the school district has 
decreased during any of the past five years 
Inflation Adjusted Decrease in AV Whether the inflation adjusted assessed valuation of the school 
district has decreased during any of the past five years 
Population Change Percentage The percentage increase or decrease of the population of the 
school district during the past five years 
Percent of Tax Collections The percent of property tax bills paid during past three years 
Top Five Taxpayers to AV Ratio The taxable value of the real estate owned by the top five 
property taxpayers / total school district assessed valuation 
Top Ten Taxpayers to AV Ratio The taxable value of the real estate owned by the top ten property 
taxpayers / total school district assessed valuation 
Top Twenty-Five Taxpayers to AV 
Ratio 
The taxable value of the real estate owned by the top twenty-five 
property taxpayers / total school district assessed valuation 
Percent of AV In One Industry The percent of the school district’s total assessed valuation that is 
in one type of industry 
Percent of AV From Largest Taxpayer Percent of total assessed valuation of school district that the 
district’s largest taxpayer holds 
 
 
Table 5 
Individual and Family Affordability Index 
 
Index Item Description 
Number of Personal Bankruptcies Number of individual or family bankruptcies during 
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each of last three years 
Personal Bankruptcies to Population Ratio Number of personal bankruptcies during each of last 
three years / number of school district residents 
Number of Residential Tax Delinquencies Number of individual or families who have current 
outstanding property tax delinquencies on their 
personal residences 
Amount of Residential Tax Delinquencies Total dollar amount of current individual or families 
with property tax delinquencies on their personal 
residences 
Residential Tax Delinquencies to AV Ratio Total dollar amount of residential individual or 
family owned property tax delinquencies during 
each of last three years to total school district 
assessed valuation 
Median Household Income Median household income of all families residing in 
school district 
Residential Foreclosures to Number of Residences 
Ratio 
Number and percent of single family residential 
foreclosures during each of last three years / total 
number of single family residential units in school 
district 
People Living in Poverty to Population Ratio Number and percent of individuals living at or 
below federal poverty level / total population in 
school district 
Children Living in Poverty to Population Ratio Number and percent of children living at or below 
federal poverty level / total population in school 
district 
Single Parent Households to Population Ratio Number and percent of single parent households / 
total population in school district 
Disabled People to Population Ratio Number and percent of disabled people / total 
population in school district 
People Over Age 65 to Population Ratio Number and percent of people over age 65 / total 
population in school district 
Free and Reduced Lunch to Population Ratio Number of children on free or reduced lunch / total 
population in school district 
 
 
 Commentary and Recommendations for Further Research. It should be 
understood that the above tripartite set of criteria is not a magic formula for determining 
affordability. The author does not represent that it is the only set of criteria that can be 
developed to measure affordability. It is but one example of a possible set of quantitative 
criteria that can be developed to help Indiana’s school districts, local tax boards, state tax 
boards, and taxpayers make informed judgments on the affordability of school bond 
issues.  
 
 Neither is this tripartite set of criteria a complete formula for determining 
affordability of school district debt. It is a mere skeleton outline of the criteria. Flesh 
needs to be added to the skeleton by inserting specific standards, limits, and caps into 
each index item. For example, policymakers need to decide what debt percentage of 
assessed valuation of taxable property is appropriate? What should the standard be? 
Should it be different for growing communities (e.g. 15%) than declining communities 
(e.g. under 10%)? Another example is the tax base diversity of the community. Should 
the top five taxpayers account for no more than 25% of the tax base? Should the largest 
taxpayer account for no more than 10% of the tax base? Much is left to be answered from 
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the above set of basic criteria. The answers are policy decisions that need to be made by 
elected officials. 
 
 Reliable data may be lacking for some of the index items. Meaningful 
measurements of the index items need to be developed for measuring the affordability of 
school district bond issues. Especially helpful would be statewide medians, means, and 
standard deviations for all Indiana school districts for these index items. Statewide 
statistics as well as statistics by size, wealth, and demographics of similar school districts 
would be beneficial. Moody’s medians and Standard and Poor’s means can be used as a 
national or regional comparison of school districts. What is important to understand is 
that statistics without any meaningful comparisons will not be sufficiently informative to 
help policy-makers and taxpayers make sound decisions on affordability of school 
districts’ debt. 
 
 The collecting of useful data, the calculation of data, and the dissemination of 
meaningful data for determining affordability of bond issues is not being done locally by 
school boards. First of all, they don’t have the expertise or staff to do so. Secondly, they 
would be under the burden of voluntary compliance with their requests for data from 
other schools, and would not likely find many school districts with the willingness to 
spend the time to collect the data. Thus, if the use of meaningful data and comparisons in 
determining affordability is to become a reality, the state must take the lead and 
undertake the project of collecting the data, analyzing the data, and distributing the data 
to school districts and their taxpayers. Transparency of the data is the key to meaningful 
decision-making. 
 
 Much more research needs to be done and many questions arise. Will the 
quantitative data be understood by school boards and the citizens, or is it too complicated 
to provide meaningful dialogue on the issue of affordability of school district debt? What 
do school boards and taxpayers believe to be appropriate standards, limits, and caps? 
 
 A question arises as to the impact of the recent movement in Indiana to a market 
value assessed valuation of real property pursuant to the 1997 Indiana Tax Court 
decision.55 Indiana’s Constitution provides in Article 13 Section 1 in part that 
 
 “No political or municipal corporation in this State shall ever become  
 indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, in the aggregate, 
 exceeding two per centum on the value of the taxable property within such 
 corporation….” 
 
 Because the move toward a market valuation system of property taxation resulted 
in roughly tripling the taxable assessed valuation of real property in school districts 
throughout the state, does this mean that Indiana taxpayers can afford three times the 
taxes than before implementation of the new system? It appears that under the new 
system the debt allowed under Article 13 Section 1 has about tripled. This emphasizes the 
need for affordability criteria. 
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 If this was not enough flexibility to issue local debt, Indiana courts have held that 
future annual lease rental payments made to school building corporations by school 
corporations pursuant to a lease do not violate the two percent debt limitation, even 
where the total rental for the term exceeds the school corporation’s debt limit, when the 
annual lease rental installments do not increase the debt beyond the limit, even though the 
lease includes an option to purchase.56 Thus, by all practical accounts, the two percent  
constitutional debt limit has been reduced to a fiction. All a school corporation has to do 
is to form one or more public or private school building corporations pursuant to Indiana 
statute57 and it can issue as much debt as the Department of Local Government Finance 
and the taxpayers will let it issue, notwithstanding the two percent limit of the Indiana 
Constitution. The statute permitting local school districts to avoid the constitutional debt 
limitation is a sham and is yet another illustration of the necessity for the establishment of 
affordability criteria. 
  
 The debate in Indiana should also include a vigorous discussion on the issue of 
equity. Is the current system where the Indiana General Assembly essentially delegates to 
local school districts and their taxpayers the decisions to renovate, build new schools, and 
issue long-term debt instruments a fair and equitable way of making building program 
decisions? Is it a system that rewards wealthy communities and penalizes poor 
communities? Has this delegation of authority by the state led to inequities throughout 
the state? Does the present system of financing school construction and technology allow 
some schools to put million dollar artificial grass on their football fields while others play 
on barren grass and mud? Do some children go to dark, dingy, non air conditioned 
schools fifty to seventy-five years old or more, and others go to brand new shining, 
architecturally pleasing, state-of-the-art fully air conditioned schools? Do some teachers 
have all the computers and software, LCD projectors, and smart-boards, that they ever 
dreamed of, and do other teachers not have access to this technology? 
 
 Is this the best way to construct the school facilities needed for the education of 
the state’s children? Do children of wealthy parents who can afford to move to growing 
and wealthy school districts that continually build new facilities and buy all the new 
technology desired, benefit at the expense of middle class and economically deprived 
children who cannot afford to move to the wealthy districts?  
 
 A more basic issue is whether Indiana really needs $100 million dollar high 
schools and other schools costing tens of millions of dollars. Are Indiana public school 
districts building dinosaurs that may not even be needed a decade or so from now? Are 
there less expensive ways to house children while they learn, and if so, can they be just as 
efficient in providing a sound learning environment? What impact can distance learning 
have on the need for new construction or expensive remodeling? Can charter schools, 
some of whom operate in storefronts, malls, offices, and other buildings, take some of the 
demand off the table for building new schools and remodeling old schools? Could 
Indiana taxpayers save tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars by the state’s leaders 
thinking out of the box and developing new, creative, innovative, and less expensive 
ways to provide the necessary learning environments for Indiana’s school children? 
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 Yet another question for further research concerns the efforts of school boards to 
decrease the need for building programs. Have school districts done everything possible 
to diminish the need for proposed building projects, or at least to reduce the cost by 
making new buildings or renovations smaller? Some school districts have proposed 
building projects that include additions to buildings for more kindergarten classrooms 
while they have empty classrooms in other buildings, and while dozens upon dozens of 
classrooms in community churches go unused during the week.  
 
 Will the new county tax adjustment boards serve as effective fiscal watchdogs to 
control local government spending and debt?58 Early returns are not encouraging.59 
Without any meaningful quantitative criteria for determining debt affordability these 
county tax adjustment boards will be reduced to yet one more level of meaningless 
government, or worse yet, will make unwise property tax decisions based on inadequate 
data. 
 
 Finally, the last question and area of further needed research is whether Indiana’s 
way of financing school construction and technology violates the Indiana Constitution. 
Article 8 Section 1 provides in part: 
 
 “…it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to…provide, by law,  
 for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition 
 shall be without charge, and equally open to all.” 60 
  
 Whether the Indiana General Assembly is meeting its Constitutional obligation to 
provide a general and uniform system of public schools in Indiana is open for debate. The 
reason is that the Indiana Supreme Court has not definitely ruled that a system that 
provides potentially a wide disparity in school facilities, equipment, and technology to 
Indiana’s school children fulfills the Constitutional mandate.  This is particularly 
questionable when one considers that the capital projects fund has been expanded to 
include not only school building and renovation expenses, but also now can be used for: 
 
1. purchasing, leasing, repairing, or maintaining equipment;61  
2. construction, repair, replacement, remodeling, or maintaining sports 
facilities (up to five percent of property capital projects fund tax revenues 
in the calendar year);62 
3. purchase, lease, upgrade, maintain, or repair computer hardware, software, 
wiring and computer networks, communication access systems used to 
connect with computer networks or electronic gateways, computer 
maintenance employees, conduct nonrecurring in-service technology 
training of school employees, to acquire any equipment or services 
necessary to implement the technology preparation curriculum, to 
participate in a program to provide educational technologies, including 
computers in the homes of students, the 4R’s technology program, or any 
other program under the educational technology program described in 
statute,63 or to obtain any combination of equipment or services described 
above;64  
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4. purchase land, buildings, building materials, and equipment for vocational 
building trades classes;65  
5. leasing or renting existing real estate;66 
6. salaries and fringe benefits for certain categories (an exhaustive list) of 
maintenance employees under certain conditions;67 
7. energy savings contracts;68 
8. carry out the school district’s plan for improving indoor air quality;69 
9. utility services;70 
10. property or casualty insurance premiums under certain conditions;71 
11. transfer money to other funds,72 specially for implementation of the 
district’s technology preparation task force,73 for the repair and 
replacement fund,74 for the district’s health services and liability self-
insurance fund with certain limitations;75 and 
12. advances for the school district’s educational technology program.76 
 
 The debt service fund also has been expanded to include items other than payment 
of interest and principal on school district debt. School districts can pay unreimbursed 
costs of textbooks for the district’s students who were eligible for free or reduced 
lunches.77 Also, districts have been allowed to issue bonds and establish a separate debt 
service fund for payment of employee severance and retirement benefits given by the 
local school board.78 Although the statute required the school district to lower its  
property tax levy for it’s transportation, school bus replacement, capital projects, art 
association, or historical society funds in an amount equal to the new debt needed to pay 
off the retirement and severance bonds, clever superintendents merely upped the levy in 
one or more of those funds the year before the district sought approval for its retirement 
or severance bonds, and then only to “drop” the fund in an amount equal to the debt 
service payment the first year of paying for the bonds. 
 
 What all of this means is that through the years the Indiana General Assembly has 
transferred more and more of a district’s normal operating costs to the local property tax 
levy. The wealthy districts have been funding more and more salaries, fringe benefits 
such as health insurance, retirement, and severance benefits, and technology costs though 
their local property tax levies. This raises the inevitable question: Has this half-hazard 
financing scheme created a public school system that is not uniform under the Indiana 
Constitution? Are the state’s wealthy children enjoying educational privileges provided 
by the State of Indiana that the state does not provide to the middle class children and 
children of poverty? Only the Indiana Supreme Court can provide that state with the 
answer. 
 
 The Governor of Indiana has stated that between 1984 and 2006, property taxes 
for school debt service and capital projects have increased over 8% per year.79 The 
Governor has also stated that between those same years, local spending funded by 
property taxes increased from $1.1 billion dollars to $7.9 billion dollars, averaging 6.1% 
per year. Given all of the above ways the Indiana General Assembly has added to the 
local taxpayers’ burden, is it any wonder there is a property tax crisis throughout Indiana? 
 
Nov. 15, 2007 
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